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ABSTRACT
IP protocol is the core of TCP/IP network layer. However,
since IP address and its Domain Name are allocated and man-
aged by a single agency, there are risks of centralization. e
semantic overload of IP address also reduces its scalability
and mobility, which further hinders the security.
is paper proposes a co-governing Multi-Identier Net-
work (MIN) architecture that constructs a network layer with
parallel coexistence of multiple identiers, including iden-
tity, content, geographic information, and IP address. On
the management plane, we develop an ecient management
system using consortium blockchain with voting consensus,
so the network can simultaneously manage and support by
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hundreds or thousands of nodes with high throughput. On
the data plane, we propose an algorithm merging hash table
and prex tree (HTP) for FIB, which avoids the false-negative
error and can inter-translate dierent identiers with tens of
billions of entries. Further, we propose a scheme to transport
IP packets using CCN as a tunnel for supporting progres-
sive deployment. We deployed the prototype of MIN to the
largest operators’ network in Mainland China, Hongkong
and Macao, and demonstrated that the network can register
identier under co-governing consensus algorithm, support
VoD service very well.
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1 INTRODUCTION
e Internet architecture based on IP has continuously evolved
during the last decades. Its end-to-end transmission mode
accelerated its deployment worldwide. However, in IP based
network, the allocation and management of IP addresses
are controlled by a single agency. Such centralization brings
risks. On the other hand, IP addresses represent both the loca-
tion and the identity information of nodes, causing semantic
overload. ese problems hinder the scalability of routing
and its adaptation to mobile devices. e lack of identity
tracking and managing also reduce the security of IP-based
networks [5, 15, 16]. e defects in security and tractability
make the IP network unsuitable for supporting emerging
scenarios, such as Content-Centered Network (CCN), high-
speed mobile network, Internet of ings, and Industrial
Internet. e situation poses urgent demand for a new gen-
eration of future network architectures.
To improve the performance of IP-based networks, Eu-
ropean Union launched the rst phase of Future Internet
Research and Experimentation (FIRE) program [6] to explore
future network and service mechanisms. e project focused
on exploring the self-adapting management mechanism in
the future network to increase its level of intelligence. How-
ever, this study did not produce a new network architecture
design. e NDN project [21] backed by the National Science
Foundation (NSF) aims to develop a network architecture
based on content. e MobilityFirst project [18] prioritizes
the identity of nodes and eciently manage the movement of
nodes. It uses the General Delay-Tolerant Network (GDTN)
to enhance the robustness and availability of network.
To decentralize the management of the network architec-
ture, blockchain [14] and other solutions [3, 4, 8, 9, 17] have
recently been applied to build a future network under co-
governing. Namecoin [13] and Blockstack [1] rst applied
blockchain to decentralize the management of domain name
system. However, its underlying system based on public
blockchain creates boleneck for its performance. To solve
the problem, Benshoof et al. proposed an alternative solution
of DNS system based on blockchain and distributed hash
table named D3NS [2], which provides solutions to current
DNS vulnerabilities such as DDoS aacks. However, it risks
leaking users’ IP information and increases the diculty to
deploy in large-scale. To mitigate the problem, HyperPub-
Sub system [22] uses the passive publish/subscribe receiving
mode to reduce the trac load and the delay caused by
blockchain.
e above methods improve performance of network and
level of decentralization, respectively, but are unable to meet
both requirements[20] simultaneously. is paper proposes a
Multi-Identier Network (MIN) architecture that constructs
a network layer with parallel coexistence of multiple iden-
tiers, including identity, content, geographic information,
and IP address. To solve the two major defects of the tra-
ditional network, we decentralize the management of post-
IP identier using consortium blockchain, address or inter-
translate identiers with tens of billions of entries using
HPT for FIB. We also enhance the progressive deployment
through novel IP-CCN-IP tunnel scheme. As part of the
work, we implement the generation, management, and reso-
lution in MIN and ensure it compatible with the traditional
IP network, to support progressive deployment.
We experimented and veried MIN in operators’ network
deploy from Beijing to Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Hongkong
and Macao for streaming high-denition video. We also
tested the transmission including IP to CCN to IP, IP to CCN,
CCN to IP, and CCN to IP to CCN. e results demonstrate
that the network achieves excellent performance and can
support real-world applications with further development.
As contributions, this paper proposes a novel Multi-Identier
Network. Specically,
1) On the management plane, we design an ecient con-
sensus mechanism of consortium blockchain to achieve de-
centralized management of identiers, which is the multi-
identier system(MIS). MIS takes the same role as DNS in IP,
actually the function of DNS is only a subset of MIS.
2) On the data plane, we improve HPT-FIB by combin-
ing hash table and prex tree, which is integrated into the
multi-identier router (MIR) of MIN as a key part. Such im-
provement enables identity-centered forwarding and inter-
translation between dierent kind of identiers in a magni-
tude of tens of billions of entries.
3) We also introduce a scheme to transport IP packets
using CCN as a tunnel to support progressive deployment
of the data plane (being compatible with IP-based network).
We implemented various transmission scenarios, such as
IP-CCN-IP, IP-CCN, CCN-IP, and CCN-IP-CCN.
e rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
describes the proposed Multi-Identier Network. Section 3
demonstrates the key technologies. Section 4 presents the
quantitative results of the prototype, and section 5 provides
some concluding remarks and discusses ongoing and future
research directions.
2 MULTI-IDENTIFIER NETWORK
For the co-governing Multi-Identier Network, its decentral-
ized management and large resolution capability enable a
progressive transition from the existing network architecture
to a new one.
2.1 Network Architecture
MIN supports the coexistence of Network Identiers includ-
ing identity, content, geographic information, and IP address.
Identiers in the network are identity-centric. For example,
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the content identiers of all resources are bound to the iden-
tity identiers of their publishers. e protocol architecture
of MIN is shown in Figure.1.
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Figure 1: Protocol Architecture of MIN
e network hierarchy of MIN is shown in Figure. 2. It di-
vides the whole network into hierarchical domains from top
to boom. e nodes in the top-level domain belong to the
organizations of the major countries which jointly maintain
a consortium blockchain. e respective regional organiza-
tions govern the other domains. Among them, the registra-
tion and management mode of identiers and the specic
implementation details can vary. is low coupling guaran-
tees the security of the network and enables customization
of each domain [10] [11].
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Figure 2: Network hierarchy of MIN
e function of a complete node in the network is to par-
ticipate in the intra-domain management of users and the
registration process of identiers on the blockchain, as well
as provide inter-translation and resolution services (in this
case called Multi-Identier Router, MIR). Also, there are
supervisory nodes, individual users, and enterprise users.
Supervisory nodes are set up as the data access interfaces
between the upper and lower domains. Each supervisory
node has multiple identiers.
e architecture of MIN includes a management plane
and a data plane. e management plane is responsible
for generation and management of identiers. Aer the
supervisory nodes verify the identier and reach a consensus
through the consensus algorithm, it records the relevant
aribution information and operation information on the
blockchain, to make the data in the whole network unied,
tamper-resistant and traceable. e reason for storing only
the important data on-chain is to ensure eciency, while
all the information of the identiers are stored o-chain.
e data plane provides the resolution for identity, content,
geographic information and other identiers, and is also
responsible for packet forwarding and ltering.
2.2 Operation Flow
In MIN, all resources are required to register an identier
with a regulatory organization within the domain. Devices
can only access a resource in the network aer its identier
has been approved by most organizations and successfully
wrien on the blockchain. e registration process is as
follows.
S1: e user who owns the resource submits a request for
identier registration to the node of a regulatory organiza-
tion.
S2: Aer receiving the user’s request, MIR transmits the
registration data to its corresponding domain according to a
specic routing protocol.
S3: e blockchain node of the corresponding domain
reviews the compliance of the resource aer receiving its
identier registration request. If so, the resource’s identier
is then voted by all the blockchain nodes in the domain to
reach consensus.
S4: e blockchain node then returns the registration re-
sult to the original requesting node. Since the complete iden-
tier information is stored in the o-chain database rather
than the on-chain block, all databases are synchronized fre-
quently throughout the network to ensure consistency.
MIR’s process to resolve the identier is as follows.
S1: MIR judges that the identier is (1) IP address, then
query in HPT-FIB. If it exists, it will be resolved. Otherwise,
access the traditional IP network through proxies; (2) identity,
content and other identiers, then query in the cache and
HPT-FIB. If it exists, it will be resolved. Otherwise, go to S2.
S2: If MIR cannot nd the identier, recursively query the
upper domain until acquiring it.
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S3: If the identier is not found up to the top-level domain,
then query the lower domain according to the information
carried by the identier until the lowest. If it exists, MIR
will return the resolved result. Otherwise, return an error
message.
In MIN, users’ behaviors of publishing and accessing are
protected and managed, and the blockchain undeniably records
illegal actions. erefore, MIN will keep the cyberspace in
an orderly and secure state, which will direct trac to the
post-IP multi-identier network tied to the user’s identity.
3 KEY TECHNOLOGIES
As mentioned above, we use consortium blockchain, HPT
for FIB, and tunnel algorithm to improve the security, per-
formance, and scalability. In this section, we introduce those
technologies.
3.1 Consensus Algorithm for Consortium
Blockchain
On the management plane of the MIN architecture, we come
up with the APoV (Advanced Proof of Vote) consensus based
on our self-designed PoV (Proof of Vote) [12], a non-forking
consensus algorithm for consortium blockchain. e core lies
in the separation of voting rights and bookkeeping rights.
e bookkeeping nodes work in a joint eort to conduct
decentralized arbitration according to the votes of the con-
sortium nodes.
(1)Concept Description
APoV denes that data on the blockchain is stored in block
groups. A block group consists of a block group header and
a block group body. Each block group header contains the
height and voting result. e block group body includes
blocks approved by the majority of consortium nodes. Where,
each block consists of the hash value of the previous block
group, the Merkle root, the public key of the bookkeeping
node, the timestamp, and the set of transactions.
e APoV consensus divides the blockchain nodes into
three identities: consortium node, bookkeeping node, and
leader node.
• e consortium node is responsible for voting on the
generated blocks and potential bookkeeping nodes.
e number of consortium nodes in each round is a
xed constant, denoted as nc . Based on the principle
of “the minority is subordinate to the majority”, the
voting results are regarded as proof of the validity of
the block and the identity of the bookkeeping node.
• e bookkeeping node is responsible for generating
blocks in the current consensus round. e num-
ber of bookkeeping nodes is nb . At the end of the
term, the consortium nodes vote on the potential
bookkeeping nodes to produce the next bookkeep-
ing nodes.
• e leader node is responsible for counting votes and
writing the voting result into the block group header
as proof. Each consensus round has a dierent leader
node, whose number is recorded in the previous
block group header.
ere are two types of voting messages in APoV for the
transactions of identiers and election: condence vote and
verication vote.
• e validation vote is a validation of the block group.
e consortium node votes for the blocks they agree
to generate. Each block must obtain more than half
of the votes to be considered as a legal block. Simi-
larly, to correct a result, more than half of the con-
sortium nodes must agree.
• e condence vote is a successful proof for the
next bookkeeping nodes. Before the end of the cur-
rent bookkeeping nodes’ term, each potential book-
keeping node proposes a transaction of election and
receives votes from consortium nodes. e voting re-
sult indicates the trust of consortium nodes in these
nodes competing for bookkeeping rights, thus can
also be considered as the reliability of them. e
nodes with higher reliability ranking are deemed
successful in the election, with bookkeeping rights
from the next consensus round until the end of their
term.
(2)Process of Consensus
e consensus process is shown in Figure. 3.
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Figure 3: Consensus Process of APoV
Each round of the APoV consensus consists of the follow-
ing steps.
S1: Each bookkeeping node generates a block and pub-
lishes it to the network. Each blockchain node collects all
the blocks in this step.
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S2: When the consortium node collects all the block gen-
erated in S1, it votes for each block and sends a total voting
message to the leader node. e voting message contains
the hash value of each block, as well as the agreed opinion
and signature.
S3: e leader node collects the voting messages sent in S2
and counts the voting results. Statistical results and all voting
messages will be stored in the block group header when the
approval or disapproval of each block is more than half of the
number of consortium nodes. e leader node then generates
a random number as the number of the next leader node and
writes it into the block group header. Finally, the leader node
publishes the block group header to the network.
S4: When the blockchain node receives the block gener-
ated by the bookkeeping nodes and the block group header
generated by the leader node, it will store them in the data-
base as a block group.
3.2 Improved FIB
ere are multiple identiers including identity, content,
geographic information, and IP address on the data plane of
MIN. However, in the traditional FIB, the length of content
names leads to a too large table and reduces lookup speed.
On the one hand, we design the inter-translating algorithm
with multiple identiers. On the other hand, by building
hash tables and prex trees, we optimize the FIB algorithm
to improve the lookup speed at massive scale.
Figure 4: eHPT-FIBCombiningHash Table and Pre-
x Tree
(1)Reconstructing HPT-FIB
To support binary search, every true prex of the content
name stored in the table must also have corresponding en-
tries. e process of checking whether prexes exist and
adding corresponding non-real entries is known as FIB re-
construction. Typically, in a reconstructed FIB, table entries
can be divided into two categories: real entry and non-real
entry. To avoid the false-negative error in traditional binary
search, we subdivide non-real entry into the virtual entry
and the semi-virtual entry.
Algorithm 1 Insertion Algorithm
Input:
H : HT and trie-based FIB
n: n = “/c1/c2/.../cN ” is the content name to insert
f : e corresponding forwarding information of n
Output:
H : HT and trie-based FIB, with n inserted
1: lookup n in HT
2: if n is the name of a real entry (n, e) then
3: update e ’s forwarding information with f
4: else if n is the name of a non-real entry (n, e) then
5: set e ’s type to real, e ’s forwarding information to f
6: for each virtual entry (∼, e∗) in e ’s subtree do
7: set e∗’s type to semi-virtual
8: end for
9: else
10: create entry (n, eN ) and insert it to HT
11: set eN ’s type to real, eN ’s forwarding information to f
12: for i = N − 1 to 1 do
13: lookup ni = “/c1/c2/.../ci ” in HT
14: if ni is the name of an entry (ni , e) then
15: add ei+1 to e ’s child list, set ei+1’s parent to e
16: if e is virtual then
17: set ej (i < j < N )’s type to virtual
18: else
19: set ej (i < j < N )’s type to semi-virtual
20: end if
21: return
22: else
23: create entry (ni , ei ) and insert it to HT
24: add ei+1 to ei ’s child list, set ei+1’s parent to ei
25: end if
26: end for
27: add ei to root ’s child list, set ei ’s parent to root
28: set ej (0 < j < N )’s type to virtual
29: end if
e content names in the real entries referred to the actual
data are used to forward Interest packets. All of the table
entries are real before FIB reconstruction. Content names in
non-real entries do not refer to data or guide the forwarding
of Interest packets but are only used to support the binary
search algorithm. A non-real entry is called a virtual entry
if it has no real prex. If the non-real entry has a real pre-
x, the table entry is called semi-virtual entry and requires
backtracking before the end. We present the semi-virtual
entry to avoid the false-negative error in HPT-FIB when the
binary search process ends with a virtual entry.
e HPT-FIB is shown in Figure.4. In the hash table, each
content name (such as /c1/c4/c5) is calculated as the key, and
its value points to the node in the prex tree. Edges in the
prex tree represent a content name component (such as /c1).
Each node represents a content name, which splices all the
components on the path from this node to the root. In a tree
node, there are ve pieces of information: state, parent node
pointer, child node pointer, brother node pointer, forward
pointer, which maintain the structure of the tree.
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Algorithm 2 Deletion Algorithm
Input:
H : HT and trie-based FIB
n: n = “/c1/c2/.../cN ” is the content name to delete
Output:
H : HT and trie-based FIB, with n deleted
1: lookup n in HT
2: if n is not the name of a real entry (n, e) then
3: return
4: end if
5: if for n’s entry (n, e), if e is not a leaf then
6: set e ’s forwarding information to N/A
7: if e ’s parent is semi-virtual or real then
8: set e ’s type to semi-virtual
9: else
10: create an empty queue q and insert e into it
11: while q is not empty do
12: e∗ = q.pop()
13: set e∗’s type to virtual
14: insert all e∗’s semi-virtual child nodes into q
15: end while
16: end if
17: else
18: remove e from its parent’s child list
19: delete entry (n, e) in HT
20: for i = N − 1 to 1 do
21: for ni = “/c1/c2/.../ci ” and its entry (ni , ei )
22: if ei is non-real and ei is a leaf then
23: remove ei from its parent’s child list
24: delete entry (ni , ei ) in HT
25: else
26: return
27: end if
28: end for
29: end if
Establishing HPT-FIB includes two basic operations: in-
sertion and deletion, whose algorithms are shown in Algo-
rithm. 1 and Algorithm. 2 respectively.
(2)e Inter-translating Scheme
In the network, routers in each domain maintain the HPT-
FIB of multiple identiers. is table records various iden-
tiers of resources. e identier inter-translating scheme
is used to provide translation between dierent identiers
when users query resources.
When users register and publish content resources on
MIN, the bounded identiers are stored in the prex tree
whose array header is maintained by forwarding pointer
(P Forward ). When users query with content name, it routes
without translation. When users query with another identi-
er, the network searches the P Forward of the content, then
selects the corresponding content name for routing.
(3)e Lookup Algorithm
In order to meet MIN’s requirement of large-scale and fast
routing, we design a high-speed lookup algorithm of HPT-
FIB. It adopts binary search under the longest prex matching
(LPM) principle. As introducing semi-virtual entries, the
return values for dierent HITs are dierent from traditional
binary searches. Specically, there are three paerns based
on the category of the last HIT entry.
• If it is a real entry, the search for LPM is successful,
and return the corresponding information.
• If it is a virtual entry, it is sure that there is no match-
ing real prex in the table, so return with no match.
• If it is a semi-virtual entry, there is at least one match-
ing real prex in the table. We can backtrack in the
prex tree to nd the matching real prex out and
return it. Since backtracking in the prex tree does
not involve searching, this process has a minimal
time overhead.
So, there are two kinds of lookup results. One is HIT,
which means that there is a corresponding real entry in HPT-
FIB (i.e., the last HIT entry is real entry or semi-virtual entry).
e other is MISS, which means that the corresponding real
entry does not exist (i.e., the last HIT entry is virtual). We
test these two application scenarios in Section 4.2.
3.3 Tunnel Transmission
To promote the progressive deployment of MIN, we propose
a tunnel scheme based on the new typed networks. Taking
CCN as an example, this section describes the process of
using it as a tunnel to transport IP packets.
(1)Problem Description
CCN [7] has revolutionized the address-centric transport
architecture based on TCP/IP protocol. To realize the pro-
gressive deployment, TCP and CCN need to communicate
mutually. ere are many diculties with this process. First,
TCP is an end-to-end protocol that communicates through
IP addresses and port numbers, which contradicts CCN’s
content-based philosophy. Second, in CCN, communica-
tion is a user-initiated process of “pulling” the required data.
However, in TCP, it is a “push” process in which the sender
sends data, and the receiver replies the acknowledgment
message. e two are fundamentally dierent in semantics.
ird, TCP ensures reliable end-to-end transmission, which
CCN does not address.
(2)Tunnel Scheme
In the scheme, CCN is directly deployed on the MAC layer
of Ethernet to get rid of the dependence on IP completely.
e architecture of combining Ethernet transmission, TCP
transmission, and UDP transmission is shown in Figure.5.
MIN: Co-Governing Multi-Identifier Network Architecture and Its Prototype on Operator’s NetworkC ference’17, July 2017, Washington, DC, USA
IP Network
Sender
Receiver
 
Ethernet/TCP/UDP 
CCN Router
Multi-Identifier
Router
1
① send TCP packets
② cache TCP packets
2
3
5
4
8
 
9
⑤ send data packets loaded with TCP packets
⑧ send interest packets with ACK
34
58
6
7
⑥ receive TCP packets
⑦ send ACK
⑨ receive ACK
Application Layer
Transprot Layer
Network Layer
Application Layer
Content 
Layer
Ethernet Data Link Layer
Physical Layer
③ send interest packets with TCP/IP headers
④ forward interest packets with TCP/IP headers
CCN
IP Network CCN
 
IP Network
IP Network
Figure 5: e Schematic Diagram of IP-CCN-IP Trans-
mission
To enable the two TCP ends to communicate through CCN,
the scheme sets a pair of conversion nodes at the boundary
between the IP network and the CCN. e transformation
between identiers and encapsulation of packets are carried
out in MIR. Each MIR has a name mapped to its IP address
as the routing prex on the CCN, allowing CCN packets to
ow smoothly to the designated multi-identier router for
further processing.
Connection Establishment: In this scheme, the three-
way handshake to establish a connection between two TCP
ends of IP networks is modied into the three-way Interest
packet switches, as shown in Figure.6. e TCP end sends
SYN, SYN + ACK, and ACK control signaling to MIR. e
CCN transports the TCP control signaling by encapsulat-
ing it into the Interest packet header. Finally, the receiving
MIR forwards the control signaling to the other TCP end,
thus completing the connection establishment of IP-CCN-IP
transmission.
Figure 6: Connection Establishment of IP-CCN-IP
Transmission
Connection Termination: e four-way handshake
of connection termination between the two TCP ends is
modied to the four-way Interest packet switches. e logic
of Interest packets switching in this process is similar to that
of the connection establishment.
4 PROTOTYPE AND EXPERIMENT
We developed a prototype of MIN and deployed it on the
actual operators’ network. is section tests and analyzes its
ability on generation, management, and resolution, including
the performances of the consensus algorithm, HPT-FIB query,
and VoD service.
4.1 Advanced Proof of Vote
is section calculates the throughput of the blockchain
consensus algorithm on the management plane of MIN. In
APoV, since a new round of consensus can start only aer
the end of the current one, we calculate throuдhput through
the time spent on each round of consensus. Consensus time
consists of computation time and transmission time, that is,
tcons = tcomp + ttran (1)
(1)Calculation of the Transmission Time ttran
According to the consensus steps in Section 3.1, in S1, the
communication trac of each bookkeeping node is the sum
of block messages sent by it, and the communication trac
of each consortium node is all the block messages it receives.
e communication pressure of the bookkeeping node is
higher than that of the consortium node, so the transmission
time in S1 is the communication time of the bookkeeping
node,
t1tran = (nb + nc − nbc − 1) · (M + H +T · K)/band (2)
where nb , nc and nbc are the number of bookkeeping
nodes, consortium nodes and nodes concurrently holding
these two identities respectively. M , H and T are the size of
the message header, the block header, and the transaction,
respectively. K is the maximum number of transactions that
can be placed within each block. band is the bandwidth of
each node (assuming the same uplink and downlink band-
width).
To balance the computing power between nodes, we as-
sume that the leader node does not concurrently serve as the
consortium node. In this case, the transmission time in S2 is
t2tran = nc · (M + Hv + nb ·Vb )/band (3)
where Hv and Vb are the size of the vote header and the
single vote, respectively.
Similarly, the transmission time in S3 is
t3tran = (nb +nc −nbc −1)[M +Hr +nbRb +nc (Hv +nb ·Vb )]/band
(4)
where Hr and Rb are respectively the size of the voting
result header and the voting result of a single block.
According to Equation (2)-(4), the transmission time is
ttran = t
1
tran + t
2
tran + t
3
tran (5)
(2)Calculation of the Computation Time tcomp
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Consider a simple network scenario of consortium blockchain
with two servers, where Server A runs a blockchain node,
and Server B runs multiple blockchain nodes. To reduce
the waste of computing power, we set each node as both
bookkeeping node and consortium node. We make the node
on Server A the leader node.
Since the bandwidth in Server B is much larger than that
between A and B, the transmission time of nodes on Server
B can be regarded as 0, and the transmission time of Server
A still follows the conclusion above. e advantage of this
scenario is that it eliminates the impact of asynchronous
transmission on performance in distributed networks, and
only analyzes computational factors.
e blockchain parameters of the prototype areK = 10000,
M = 266Byte , H = 692Byte , T = 40Byte , Hv = 400Byte ,
Vb = 100Byte ,Hr = 170Byte ,Rb = 400Byte ,band = 1Gbps =
125MB/s , and the CPU of the server is Intel Xeon Silver
4114@2.20GHz. From the perspective of Server A, the states
of the single blockchain node and the whole blockchain net-
work can be observed simultaneously. We run 10 rounds of
consensus at dierent scales. e time consumption of each
step and each round is measured on Server A and averaged,
as shown in Table. 1.
According to the consensus steps in Section 3.1, the re-
lationship between the time consumption of S1, S2 and S4
and the number of nodes n is linear. In S3, when n increases,
the number of blocks that each consortium node needs to
vote increases, so its time consumption can be described by
a quadratic function. e time consumption of each step in
Table. 1 is ed to
t1comp = 0.0041n + 0.0174
t2comp = 0.0130n + 0.0229
t3comp = 0.0012n2 − 0.0082n + 0.0415
t4comp = 0.0052n + 0.0062
(6)
Further understanding of Equation (6) is that, t1comp is
reected in the computation of the bookkeeping node, t2comp
in the computation of the consortium node, t3comp in the
computation of the leader node, and t4comp in the computation
of each node.
According to Equation (2)-(5), the transmission time ttran
is a cubic function of the number of nodes n, so the con-
sensus time tcons can be described by a cubic function. e
consensus time in Table. 1 is ed to
tcons =
0.0312n3 − 0.1920n2 + 2.0714n + 11.2500
125 (7)
Substitute the parameter value of the prototype into Equa-
tion (2)-(5) to get the transmission time is
ttran = t
1
tran + t
2
tran + t
3
tran
=
0.0001n3 + 0.0008n2 + 0.3213n − 0.3214
125
(8)
According to Equation (1), the computation time is
tcomp = tcons − ttran
=
0.0311n3 − 0.1928n2 + 1.7501n + 11.5714
125
(9)
Consider the further understanding of Equation (6). Take
the computing power of the servers in the prototype as the
standard. For a blockchain network with computing power
a, that is, the maximum computing power used by all nodes
for consensus is a times of the standard computing power,
then the minimum computation time is shown in Equation
(10).
According to Equation (5) and (10), the minimum consen-
sus time in the network is
t ′cons = t
′
comp + ttran (11)
To sum up, the upper limit of throughput within the
blockchain network is shown in Equation (12).
Based on Equation (12), it is possible to estimate the up-
per limit of performance in the real blockchain network
composed of servers and switches using APoV consensus al-
gorithm. In the consortium blockchain network, each server
typically runs only one node. Assuming that the other con-
gurations of nodes are the same, when their CPUs are Intel
Xeon Silver 4114@2.20GHz, Intel Xeon Silver 4116@2.10GHz,
and Intel Xeon Gold 5118@2.30GHz respectively1, the up-
per limit of throughput is aected by n and band , as shown
in Figure.7 (1)-(3). When the bandwidth of nodes is set as
1Gbps, 8Gbps and 10Gbps respectively, the inuence of n
and a on the upper limit of throughput is shown in Figure.7
(4)-(6).
When the number of nodes is small (generally less than
10), the computing power used for consensus is not fully
utilized, so the number of nodes is the main factor aect-
ing the throughput. When the number of nodes increases,
the performance can be approximately increased with the
improvement of computing power and bandwidth.
At present, the throughput of most blockchain consen-
sus algorithms is less than 100 thousand transactions per
second[19]. We measure the prototype consisting of 20
blockchain nodes, each of which is responsible for both vot-
ing and bookkeeping. e APoV consensus can achieve a
stable throughput of more than 300 thousand transactions
per second. Although the actual value is much lower than
the theoretical value in Figure. 7, it greatly exceeds other
1Data Sources: hp://cdn.malu.me/cpu/
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Table 1: Average Time of the Node on Server A in 10 Rounds of Consensus
Number of Nodes n Time Consumption (s) roughput (tx/s)
S1 S2 S3 S4 A Round ofConsensus
3 0.0311 0.0642 0.0255 0.0217 0.132 223706
4 0.0326 0.0750 0.0323 0.0268 0.150 263583
5 0.0377 0.0861 0.0295 0.0319 0.163 302719
6 0.0416 0.0986 0.0367 0.0377 0.189 315861
7 0.0470 0.113 0.0392 0.0419 0.217 322992
8 0.0505 0.130 0.0552 0.0477 0.252 314743
t ′comp =
tcomp
a
· [1 + (0.0012n
2 + 0.0141n + 0.0880)
n(0.0223n + 0.0465) ] =
(0.0235n2 + 0.0606n + 0.0880)(0.0311n3 − 0.1928n2 + 1.7501n + 11.5714)
a(2.7875n2 + 5.8125n)
(10)
throuдhput =k · n/t ′cons
=10000n/[ (0.0235n
2 + 0.0606n + 0.0880)(0.0311n3 − 0.1928n2 + 1.7501n + 11.5714)
a(2.7875n2 + 5.8125n) +
(0.0001n3 + 0.0008n2 + 0.3213n − 0.3214)
band
]
(12)
Table 2: e Time for Generating HPT-FIB Entries
Size of FIB
(billion) 0.1 1.0 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5
Run
Time(s) 187.58 1649.75 3723.98 4925.64 6271.49 7760.69
Actual
Size of FIB
(billion)
0.1 1.0 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5
consensus algorithms. We will continue optimizing the al-
gorithm code of APoV to utilize the computing power and
bandwidth in the network entirely.
4.2 FIB Combining Hash Table and Prex
Tree
is section calculates the scale and throughput of HPT-FIB
algorithm on the data plane of MIN.
(1)Scalability
e data source of the experiment is the self-generated
CCN content names. As CCN has not deployed on a large
scale, it is dicult to obtain large-scale CCN dataset from
the real network. erefore, we extract statistical features
from the current network ow and obtain a large number of
random URL-like names through simulation to generate a
large-scale HPT-FIB. e test of building time for HPT-FIB
is shown in Table. 2.
e test result indicates that the HPT-FIB in this scheme
can support large-scale prex of content names storage.
(2)Lookup Performance
Table 3: eroughput of Name Searchwith all MISS
N Linear Search Binary SearchAverage
Searching
Time
roughput
Average
Searching
Time
roughput
(No
Backtrack)
roughput
(HPT-FIB)
6 6 100% 2.34 236% 235%
7 7 100% 2.54 250% 247%
8 8 100% 2.70 267% 266%
9 9 100% 2.85 280% 279%
10 10 100% 2.96 301% 299%
In this section, we test the lookup speed of HPT-FIB. e
contrast algorithm includes LPM-based linear search and
LPM-based binary search without backtracking in the prex
tree. As mentioned above, there are two kinds of lookup
results: HIT and MISS. We test these two application scenar-
ios.
For every testing, we lookup 500,000 times in HPT-FIB,
which contains 5 million real entries. e above experiments
are carried out ten times, and we count up their average val-
ues for evaluation and analysis. For the sake of comparison,
the measurement is set to Operation roughput, which is in-
versely proportional to the average operating time. Also, the
throughput rate for linear search is set to 1 as a benchmark.
When the average length of the content names to be
searched is N , and the result is all MISS, which means that
none inquired content name correspond to a real entry in
HPT-FIB, the performances are shown in Table. 3.
When lookup does not HIT, the linear search needs to
traverse all prexes of content names. e time cost is pro-
portional to the length of content names, causing problems
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Figure 7: e Inuence of Node Number n, Computing Power a and Bandwidth band on the Upper Limit of
roughput in the APoV Blockchain
about eciency and security. In contrast, binary search re-
duces the computational overhead of the LPM algorithm
to the logarithmic level, which signicantly improves the
throughput. Also, since our algorithm needs no backtrack-
ing when lookup ends without HIT, the time cost is close
to the original binary search. As a result, we solve the false
negative error with acceptable costs.
For the lookup test of all HIT which means that every
inquired content name corresponds to a real entry in HPT-
FIB, we assume that the average length of content names
is M with distribution ρ(N ; λ¯). Since the average length of
domain names is 2 or 3 and CCN content names are generally
longer than URL requests in HTTP, we use M = 4, 5 as the
test parameter. e performances of all HIT are shown in
Table. 4.
When lookup ends with HIT, the average time cost of the
linear search is proportional to (N−M+1). e time of binary
search is almost not aected by M and is approximately
proportional to loд(N ). For the scenarios with long content
Table 4: eroughput of Name Search with all HIT
M N Linear Search Binary Search
Average
Searching
Time
rough-
put
Average
Searching
Time
rough-
put (No
Backtrack)
rough-
put
(HPT-
FIB)
3
6 3.98 100% 2.84 126% 123%
7 4.99 100% 3.02 131% 130%
8 6.02 100% 3.17 151% 150%
9 7.00 100% 3.31 168% 167%
10 8.01 100% 3.45 185% 183%
4
6 3.03 100% 2.90 85% 85%
7 4.00 100% 3.06 104% 101%
8 5.02 100% 3.21 123% 124%
9 6.02 100% 3.35 141% 139%
10 7.03 100% 3.47 159% 159%
names to be searched and short table entries, the HPT-FIB
lookup is faster.
According to the test results, the backtracking does not
aect lookup speed because of no string searching. erefore,
the proposed algorithm solves the false negative error in
random search with minimal eciency loss.
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4.3 Tunnel Transmission
e prototype realizes tunnel transmission under various
network scenarios, including IP-CCN-IP, IP-CCN, CCN-IP,
and CCN-IP-CCN. e topology is shown in Figure.8. Based
on this, the prototype can provide High Denition Video
on Demand (HDVoD) service with multiple transmission
channels.
e exporting bandwidth of the servers in Peking Uni-
versity Shenzhen Graduate School (PKUSZ) is 100M spe-
cial broadband, and that of other institutions is also more
than 50M. On top of the bandwidth constraint, the network
environment dierences between operators and between
mainland China, Hong Kong, and Macao may limit the trans-
mission rates. e following are the experimental results of
our prototype under four scenarios.
(1)IP-CCN-IP Transmission
Video resources are uploaded on the node pkusz1 of China
Telecom Futian and the node pkusz3 of China Telecom Nan-
shan. We rst use node10 of PKUSZ as MIR and node9 of
PKUSZ as the IP node to pull the video from pkusz1 to node9.
Figure.9 shows the detailed topology and the experimen-
tal result. It can be seen that the transmission rate reaches
2.65MB/s.
We then pull the video resource frompkusz3 tonode9. e
detailed topology and the experimental result are shown in
Figure.10, where the transmission rate is 2.44MB/s.
When video resources on pkusz1 and pkusz3 are pulled
to node9 simultaneously, the rates of the two transmission
channels are 1.18MB/s and 1.71MB/s respectively, as shown
in Figure.11. e transmission rate is lower than before
when pulling from a single node, but the total transmission
rate remains the same. e main reason is that the access
bandwidth of node9 is limited, resulting in the performance
boleneck.
(2)IP-CCN Transmission
e video resource is uploaded on the node host2 of China
Unicom Tongle in CCN. As with the IP-CCN-IP transmission,
we get the video from host2 to node9 through node10. e
tested transmission rate is 0.65MB/s.
(3)CCN-IP Transmission
e video resource is uploaded on the node дdcni1 of
Guangdong Communications & Networks Institute (DGCNI)
in the IP network. Similarly, we pull the video from дdcni1
to the node host1 of Kingso. e tested transmission rate
is 1MB/s.
(4)CCN-IP-CCN Transmission
We have also implemented the CCN-IP-CCN transmission
in the prototype of MIN. In this experiment, we place the
video resource on the nodehost2 of China Unicom Yuandong,
and pull it to the node SCUT of South China University of
Technology (SCUT). e tested transmission rate is 2.65MB/s.
5 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
A future network should be decentralized, secure and com-
patible with the existing IP-based network. In this paper,
we propose a Multi-Identier Network that constructs a net-
work layer with parallel coexistence of multiple identiers,
including identity, content, geographic information, and IP
address. e network provides the generation, management,
and resolution services of identiers and use consortium
blockchain to enable decentralized management. To further
accelerate the forwarding process, we improve HPT for FIB
by combining hash table and prex tree. In addition, we
propose a scheme of transporting IP packet using CCN as
a tunnel to support progressive deployment. Finally, we de-
velop the prototype to operators’ networks and verify its
performances of the consensus algorithm, FIB query, and
VoD service. e test results illustrate that the network
achieves excellent performance and can support real-world
applications aer further development.
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